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Numerous studies relating to the
field of dividends have been carried
out over the past twenty-seven years.
The objective of this paper is to con-
trast it with the Barclay study (1987)
and to complement the Venkatesh
paper (1989).
This piece of research concludes that,
contrary to Barclay’s findings, on
their postclosure date, share returns
in Chile do not fall in the amount of
their dividend, owing to the fact that
in this country the effect depends on
the type of dividend. Finally, and as
a complement to the Venkatesh stu-
dy, it was determined that the avera-
ge volatility of the twenty-five days
prior to closure is lower than that
evinced in the twenty-five days after
closure.
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INTRODUCTION
Chilean corporations are compelled
by law to distribute at least 30% of
their liquid profits. This makes it ex-
tremely important to measure the
impact of dividend distribution on
share returns.
Various domestic and international
studies have analysed the issue over
the past twenty-seven years. The
principal objective of this piece of re-
search is to contrast the internatio-
nal evidence provided by the Barclay
study (1987) that examines share
price behaviour on the day after the
closure of the register of shareholders
with a right to dividend payments. It
was concluded that post-closure sha-
re returns fall in an amount that is
equal to that of the dividend, in other
words investors value dividends and
capital gains as a perfect substitute.
Another objective is to complement
the Venkatesh study (1989), that con-
cludes that the volatility of share re-
turns is lower in the period that fo-
llows the announcement of a divi-
dend, which would be explained by a
lower uncertainty regarding the con-
ditions of the corporation. So, contra-
ry to what happens in the period that
precedes the announcement of a di-
vidend, investors give less importan-
ce to unverifiable information or to
information based on rumour.
Our main objective is to determine if
investors in Chile value dividends
and capital gains as a perfect substi-
tute, and our secondary objective is
to study the volatility of share retur-
ns on the days that follow the closu-
re of the register of shareholders with
a right to dividend payments, thus
complementing the Venkatesh study,
which analysed volatility before and
after the announcement. In this stu-
dy, we will measure this volatility on
the date of the closure of the register
of shareholders with a right to divi-
dend payments.
Initially we analysed dividend poli-
cies and types of dividends in Chile.
Section II describes the most impor-
tant studies carried out in the past
twenty-seven years. Section III con-
tains a methodological description.
Section IV analyses the outcome of
the study, and finally Section V ex-
plains our conclusions.
SECTION I
Dividend policy and types
of dividends in Chile
As an average, companies in Chile
distribute three provisional dividends
per year, plus one compulsory mini-
mum dividend, which is only paid
when provisional dividends to not
reach the minimum amount to be dis-
tributed.
Chilean companies are obliged by law
to distribute at least 30% of their li-
quid profits.
Other occasional dividends may be
eventual and additional. The follo-
wing is a description of different ty-
pes of dividends.
A) Provisional Dividend: The di-
vidend that the board of direc-
tors agrees to distribute during
the fiscal year, and that is char-
geable to the profits for that pe-
riod. This dividend is payable on
a date determined by the board.
B) Definite dividends: These di-
vidends are classified as follows:
B1) Compulsory Minimum divi-
dend: The dividend that the
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shareholders’ meeting agrees to
pay in order to comply with their
obligation to distribute a mini-
mum of 30% of their liquid ear-
nings for each fiscal year in the
form of a dividend.
B2) Additional Dividend: This di-
vidend is a dividend that share-
holders agree to pay over the
legal compulsory minimum di-
vidend.
B3) Eventual Dividend: This is a
dividend that corresponds to the
part of the profits that the sha-
reholders’ meeting has not ear-
marked for payment in the form
of a compulsory minimum divi-
dend or of an additional divi-
dend, and is to be paid during a
future fiscal year.
On the other had, in order to design
a dividend policy it is necessary to
bear the following in mind:
A) Corporate Fund Require-
ments: Companies should analy-
se their real capacities to keep up
a dividend flow vis-à-vis the dis-
tribution of probable future cash
flows and their respective positio-
ns. This analysis determines pro-
bable future residual funds. This
is important, as the market values
dividend stability because it gives
an implicit sign in terms of expec-
tations.
B) Liquidity: Companies should
maintain their liquidity in order
to have a higher capacity to pay
up dividends and face the unfore-
seen expenses and contingencies
that are typical of growth. This is
important, as in general, those
companies that grow and are pro-
fitable may have a low liquidity
level because they concentrate
their investments on fixed assets
and relatively non-liquid assets.
C) Borrowing Capacity: Compa-
nies should define their borrowing
capacity by establishing their di-
vidend policies with greater accu-
racy.
D) Nature of shareholders: When
a company is strictly controlled,
its management can have relati-
vely easy access to its sharehol-
ders’ expectations regarding divi-
dends, which facilitates the defi-
nition of the latter, and therefore
the vast majority of them are sub-
ject to high tax rates. Consequen-
tly, a low dividend level can be
established, but this should
always be done on the basis of the
existence of real investment op-
portunities with positive net cu-
rrent value (VAN). Higher divi-
dend levels will be required when
ownership is more diluted.
SECTION II
Empirical evidence
We will now describe important na-
tional and international studies re-
lated to dividend announcements and
payment published over the past 27
years, such as the Jensen and Mec-
kling (1976) study that established
that agency costs increased according
to the increased dilution of owners-
hip. This cost represents the diver-
gence between shareholders and the
administrator, because a lower par-
ticipation of outside shareholders in
corporate ownership will result in a
reduced possibility of monitoring and
disciplining corporate administra-
tors, and this will demand a larger
dividend payment so as to ensure
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that administrators do not make im-
proper use of the resources genera-
ted and thus reduce agency costs.
In the area of the factors that deter-
mine dividend payment, Rozlef (1982)
studied the factors that determined
dividend payment: A) External finan-
cing transaction costs, B) The finan-
cial restriction created by operational
leverage and C) Corporate financing
and agency costs. His study points out
that transaction costs are strictly re-
lated to the firm’s level of financial
and operational leverage, because its
dependence on external financing in-
creases when firm has a relatively
high leverage level. Asquith and Mu-
llins’ (1983) study analyses the case
of the companies that pay dividends
for the first time and states that the-
se present abnormal returns. The re-
sults of this study indicate that the
beginning of dividend payments and
subsequent dividend increases tend
to strengthen the wealth of sharehol-
ders. Dividends give valuable and
unique information, and constitute a
sign of the performance of a company
and of its projects for the future.
On the other hand Easterbrook
(1984) states that agency costs gene-
rated by the separation of ownership
and control can be brought down by
means of dividend policy. His analy-
sis is based on the argument that a
greater dispersion generates fewer
incentives to control administration
stock, because every individual sha-
reholder is forced to bear his own
monitoring costs, while they all cap-
ture the benefit involved. Therefore,
the optimum scenario is that all sha-
reholders monitor their stock as a
group, because if this isn’t the case,
nobody will achieve control This leads
to the appearance of free-riders.
We also have the relevant contrasting
work carried out by two important
researchers. On the one hand, we
have Miller and Rock’s (1985) study
regarding the asymmetry of informa-
tion existing among insiders (admi-
nistrators) and outsiders (external
investors). This problem emerges
owing to the fact that as insiders have
more and better information on the
value of a company, dividend pay-
ments would be a signal of current
and future earnings that have not
been observed by outsiders. On the
other hand Jensen’s (1986) study of
free cash flow leads him to conclude
that dividend payment solves the pro-
blem of free cash flow, avoiding the
misuse of these cash surpluses, whi-
ch are the surpluses left after reali-
sing all the projects with an 0+ Net
Current Value (VAN) and that are
discounted from the relevant capital
cost rate.
In another important study, Barclay
(1987) refers to the way in which in-
dividuals value dividends and capi-
tal gains the day after the closure of
the registers of shareholders with a
right to receive dividends. He conclu-
ded that the post closure share retur-
ns fall in an amount that is equal to
the dividend, which means that in-
vestors value dividends and capital
gain as a perfect substitute.
On the other hand, in their 1989 stu-
dy, Lang and Litzenburg tried to ex-
plain the effect that dividend announ-
cements had on share prices, contras-
ting the hypotheses of signalling and
free cash flow established by Miller
and Rock (1985) and Jensen (1986).
These authors use Tobin’s Q Ratio,
which is a market valuation tool that
measures corporate growth oppor-
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tunities, defined as the market value
over the replenishment of the invest-
ment, establishing that those compa-
nies that present a QSIGNO1 evince
over-investment (they invest in pro-
jects with a <0 Net Current Value
(VAN) and correspond to a free cash
flow hypothesis. They find that in the
case of dividend changes, the avera-
ge return is higher for companies that
present Q < 1, in other words, that
the market reacts more strongly
when the company is over-investing.
Therefore, in the case of Q> 1, a divi-
dend increase is a good sign, while in
the case of Q< 1, a dividend reduc-
tion is a good sign. It is important to
mention Vankatesh’s (1989) study
when referring to the area of Impact
of Dividend Initiation and the infor-
mation contained in Profit Announ-
cements and Volatility of Returns.
This study determined that as an
average, there is more information
transmitted by profit announcement
in the pre-dividend period than in the
post dividend period, establishing
that in the event of profit announce-
ments, price reactions are lower in
the post-dividend period as an ave-
rage, independently from the fact
that the announcement comes befo-
re or after the dividend announce-
ment. It also establishes that share
return volatility is lower in the post-
dividend period, which could be ex-
plained by reduced uncertainty on
the conditions of the company. And,
contrary to what happens in the pre-
dividend period, investors give less
importance to information that is
based on rumour, and lacks verifia-
ble sources.
On the other hand, it is important to
mention the Loderer and Maurer
(1992) study, that refers to the possi-
ble relationship between a dividend
payment and share issue. This study
concludes that there is no relations-
hip whatsoever between dividend
payment and the issue of new sha-
res, as these two facts generate diffe-
rent information. Dividends reflect
expected cash flows, i.e. current and
future profits, while share issue is the
reflection of the price elasticity of the
company.
Another important study is the Jen-
sen, Solberg, Zorn (1992) paper that
looks into common determiners in
terms of insider ownership, debt and
corporate dividends. In their study
«Simultaneous Determination of In-
sider Ownership, Debt and Dividend
Policies» they conclude that the debt,
dividend and insider ownership of a
firm are not only explained by their
specific attributes, but are also direc-
tly related to each other. They also
show that dividend payments are
negatively correlated with the growth
and investment opportunities of a
firm, with their leverage level and
insider ownership, the latter being
coherent with the Free Cash Flow
Hypothesis. It is also important to
refer to the Smith and Watts study
(1992), which covers the industrial
area, averaging the data of individual
companies chosen in each industry.
The study concludes that companies
with high growth opportunities pre-
sent low leverage levels, low dividend
profitability and high compensation
levels. On the other hand, large com-
panies have high dividend returns
and high compensation levels. Fina-
lly, regulation generates high levera-
ge levels, high dividend profitability,
low compensation levels and a low
frequency of incentive compensation
plan utilisation.
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Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) ve-
rify the theory that both dividends
and debt interest payments are me-
chanisms for reducing agency costs
between administration and share-
holders, because they reduce the free
cash flows that the management may
use at its discretion for its own pecu-
niary concumption and for invest-
ment in non-profit making projects.
This argument is consistent with
Jensen’s Free Cash Flow Hypothesis.
It is also important to refer to the
Yoon and Starks (1995) study, in whi-
ch they look into the relationship bet-
ween abnormal returns and Tobin’s
Q ratio, considering control variables
like changes in dividend payment,
dividend performance and company
size. Finally, they conclude that this
relationship is non-existent, so that
their results support the signalling
hypothesis of Miller and Rock (1985).
In Chile, Maqueira and Guzmán
(1997) investigated a sample of sha-
res traded in the Stock Exchange,
concluding the ex dividend share be-
haviour is determined by tax factors
rather than by abnormal returns, and
supports the hypotheses of a cliente-
le effect on the domestic market, whi-
ch is induced by the tax structure that
rules local investors. Another impor-
tant study is the Alaluf and de Río
(1999) paper that looks into the
effects of the reduction of Telefónica
Chile dividend policy by 40% to 30%
of its overall profits in 1998, conclu-
ding that the dividend cut did not
produce significantly negative effects
on the company’s share returns prior
to the announcement. This study va-
lidates the signalling hypothesis de-
veloped by Miller and Rock (1985)
that states that unexpected changes
in dividend payments might lead to
a review of expectations, which would
mean eventual changes in share pri-
ces. The Telefónica Chile case shows
that timely and appropriate informa-
tion prevents the production of unex-
pected changes in a company’s share
returns. Finally, Maqueira and Gon-
zález presented a paper in Chile in
2003 in which they studied 54 Chi-
lean companies belonging to different
industrial sectors over the 1996-2003
period. This study establishes the
existence of a trend to use dividends
as a mechanism for transmitting in-
formation to the market, and for
transmitting its current and future
flow expectations. The study conclu-
ded that Chilean administrators and
managers behave in a way that is
consistent with the signalling hypo-
thesis. On the other hand, they de-
termined that the variables that re-
present historical performance, as
would be the case of past growth and
corporate leverage, are consistent
with Rozeff ’s 1982 study regarding
the influence of transaction cost on
dividend decisions. This is inversely
related to dividends in the sense that
higher past growth and/or higher flo-
ws allocated to the fulfilment of fixed
obligations resulted in the payment
of smaller dividends as a way of not
resorting to the capital market to sa-
tisfy expensive financing needs.
SECTION III
Data and methodology applied
A) Methodology: We will use a me-
thodology based on a study of the
processes applied in provisional
and compulsory minimum defini-
te dividends. We will not study
eventual and additional dividends
as they appear sporadically in the-
se dividend processes. The objec-
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tive of this exercise is to measure
their impact on share returns in
terms of the cut-off date for enro-
lling in the register of sharehol-
ders with a right to dividend pay-
ment. We will analyse these
effects on compulsory minimum
dividends and on provisional di-
vidends, and compare the fall in
share returns on the day after the
cut-off ate, versus the increase in
dividends on the cut-off date itself.
The determination of the 0 cut-off
date is important, because after the
last transaction carried out on that
day it is impossible to gain access to
dividend payment. We will further-
more analyse 25 correlative previous
transactions, and 25 correlative sub-
sequent transactions, in order to
come to a conclusion regarding vola-
tility before and after the cut-off date.
(See Chart 1).
B) Description of the study: We
will calculate the returns of each
share over the entire period of the
study, in order to obtain an aggre-
gate graphic analysis for compul-
sory minimum definite dividends,
and for provisional dividends that
will give the average for the pre-
ceding days, for the cut-off date
and for the days that follow the
closure of the register of sharehol-
ders with a right to receive divi-
dend payment.
We will also make an individual
analysis according to company for
both compulsory definite dividends
and for provisional dividends.
C) Sample:
1. The selection will only inclu-
de dividend payments comple-
ted after 1/1/93.
2. The selection will only inclu-
de dividend payments prior to
31/12/03.
3. The shares selected will have
had a stock market presence
of not less that 40%.
4. We will select 152 compulsory
definite dividend payments.
5. We will select 152 provisional
dividend payments.
6. We will select shares that have
evinced 6 or more dividend
processes in the period under
study.
D) Statistical Models: The follo-
wing statistical models will be
used to measure returns.
1. Share returns for the interval
that exists between one tran-
saction and another is calcu-
lated as:
R i,t = ( P i,t - P i,t-1)
     P i,t-1
where:
P i,t = The price of asset i in transac-
tion t.
P i,t-1) = The price of asset I in tran-
saction t-l
2. We will calculate the average
returns for the 152 compul-
sory definite dividend pay-
ments, and for the 152 provi-
sional dividend payments. We
will also calculate the avera-
ge of each payment in the 25
transactions carried out befo-
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re the cut-off distribution date
and of the 25 transactions that
followed the cut-off distribu-
tion date.
We will also calculate the average
dividend payments for those shares
that are contained in the sample of
compulsory definite dividend pay-
ments and in the sample of provisio-
nal dividends. Average return is cal-
culated as follows:
                   N
R t = ( 1) R i,t
N I=1
where:
R t = Is the return of the N divi-
dend payments in transac-
tion t.
N = Is the total number of obser-
vations
R i,t = Is the return of asset i in
transaction t.
t = Is the transaction, which
goes from (-25, 25).
3. The increase in the dividend
paid per share is calculated on
the basis of the last transac-
tion during the closure date,
and is the difference between
the return (dividend included)
and return (dividend exclu-
ded). This gives the division
between the amount of the di-
vidend and the price on the
closure date.
R i,l =  Div l
P i,l
E) Research Hypothesis: This piece
of research has the aim of proving
the following hypotheses:
1. The fall in average share returns
on the date after the cut-off date
is larger than the average increa-
se of the amounts of the compul-
sory minimum dividends on the
cut-off date.
2. It is highly probable that the fall
of a company’s average share re-
turns on the day after the cut-off
date is higher than the average
increase of compulsory minimum
dividends on the cut-off date.
3. The fall of average share returns
on the day after the cut-off date
is lower than the average increa-
se in the value of provisional di-
vidends on the cut-off date.
4. It is highly probable that the fall
of a company’s average share re-
turns on the day after the cut-off
date is lower than the average
increase in the value of provisio-
nal dividends on the cut-off date.
5. Volatility on the days that follow
the cut-off date is higher than the
volatility observed on the days
prior to the cut-off date.
6. It is highly probable that the vo-
latility ratio betwen the days af-
ter the cut-off date/volatility prior
to the dividend’s cut-off date is
higher for compulsory minimum




We calculated the returns of each
share over the entire period of the
study so as to obtain an aggregate
graphic analysis containing 51 share
returns. Each return is the average
of 152 returns, both in terms of com-
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pulsory minimum definite dividends
and for provisional dividends, and
will give the average for the days be-
fore the closure of the register, for the
closure date and for the days that fo-
llow the closure of the register of sha-
reholders with a right to receive di-
vidend payments. On the other hand,
graphs of the returns were produced
including (green line) and excluding
the value of the dividend (blue line)
in the last transaction on the closure
date. This was carried out in order to
see if the value of the dividend is in
any way related to the fall of share
return (red line).
We also analysed company results for
compulsory minimum definite divi-
dends over 10 years, and of the 152
dividend payments included, they
affected 19 companies. In the case of
provisional dividends, the 152 pay-
ments only included 6 companies as
in Chile the ratio between provisio-
nal dividends and compulsory mini-
mum dividends is 3:1, and would ex-
plain the difference in the size of the
sample.
The two types of dividends analysed
show reduced returns on the day af-
ter the closure of the register of sha-
reholders with a right to receive di-
vidend payments. This is caused by
the fact that share prices reflect all
the information available in the mar-
ket. In other words, if the share is
transferred prior to the closure date,
in includes the dividend, while if the
transfer occurs after closure, the sha-
re price will be lower because the sha-
re was transferred on its own,
without its dividend, thus reflecting
a balanced price.
This paper concludes that in the case
of Chile, share returns after the clo-
sure of the register of shareholders
with a right to receive share pay-
ments do not fall in the amount of the
dividend, and magnitude will depend
on the type of dividend. This is cau-
sed by the existence of the Clientele
Effect in Chile, and it is caused by
the fact that individuals pay different
tax rates according to different types
of income, capital gains or dividends,
and for this reason they select those
shares that have flows that enable
them to minimise tax payments. The-
refore, the existence of personal taxes
makes people in the lower income
brackets prefer high dividend paying
shares.
Chile is a concentrated share market,
and its most important feature is a
high percentage of shares in the
hands of shareholders that pay high
tax rates, and who prefer shares that
pay low dividends. This is the case of
provisional dividends rather than
compulsory minimum definite divi-
dends, and can be explained by the
fact that investors will maintain por-
tfolios created to maximise return
rates after tax. This leads investors
to pay high tax rates per dividend, so
they will prefer those shares with low
dividend returns and higher capital
gain returns. As an average, this im-
plies that the market places a diffe-
rent value of flows received a capital
gains and dividends.
Chart 1 shows that the average of the
152 10 year dividend processes co-
rresponds to the distribution of com-
pulsory minimum definite dividends.
This proves one of the hypotheses of
this paper, which is «Average share
returns fall -3.12% on the day after
the cut-off date. This is higher than
the 2.44% average increase of com-
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pulsory minimum definite dividends
at the cut-off date». This occurs be-
cause investors place a different mar-
ket value on flows received as capi-
tal gain and as dividends. The rea-
son for this is that the Chilean stock
market has a high concentration of
ownership that produces a higher
percentage of shares in the hands of
shareholders that pay high tax rates
per dividend because they are in the
higher tax brackets. These prefer
shares that pay lower dividends (pro-
visional dividends) rather than the
high amounts involved in compulsory
minimum dividends, which therefo-
re produce an excess offer of shares,
which leads to a fall of average share
returns, which is higher than the ave-
rage value of compulsory minimum
definite dividends, as can be seen in
Graph 1.
On the other hand, Graph 1 shows
volatility and fulfils other hypotheses
of this paper. On the days the follow
the cut-off date, dividend volatility
reaches 0.69%. This is higher than the
0.21% dividend volatility on the days
prior to the cut-off date. This is cau-
sed by an excess offer the day after
cut-off which makes prices plummet.
Table 1 shows averages according to
company, and proves one of our hypo-
theses «It is highly probable that the
fall of a company’s average share re-
turns on the day after the cut-off date
is higher than the average increase
of compulsory minimum dividends on
the cut-off date». We see that in the
case of 17 companies, 89.5% of total
average share return falls on the day
after the cut-off date is higher than
the fall of a company’s average share
returns the date following the cut-off
date.
Graph 2 shows that the average of
the 152 10 year dividend processes
correspond to the distribution of pro-
visional dividends. This proves one of
the hypotheses presented in this pa-
per. The fall of average share retur-
ns on the day after the cut-off date is
-0.65%lower than the average 0,89%
increase of provisional dividends on
the cut-off date. This is caused by the
fact that investors place a different
value on flows received as capital
gains and as dividends, because the
Chilean stock market has a high con-
centration of ownership that produ-
cers a higher percentage of shares in
the hands of shareholders that pay
high tax rates per dividend because
they are in the higher tax brackets
and prefer shares that pay low divi-
dends (provisional dividends) rather
than shares that pay higher divi-
dends (compulsory minimum divi-
dends). The latter are preferred by
shareholders that pay low tax rates
and own fewer shares.
As provisional dividends result in a
lower dividend, shareholders that
have higher share percentages tend
to prefer these dividends that have
lower amounts than compulsory mi-
nimum definite dividends. The con-
sequence of this is that the fall of ave-
rage share returns is lower that the
average increase in compulsory mi-
nimum definite dividends.
On the other hand, Graph 2 proves
the volatility hypothesis presented in
this paper. Provisional dividend vo-
latility is 0.22% on the days that fo-
llow the cut-off date. This is higher
than the 0.14% volatility rate seen on
the days prior to the cut-off date, and
is the result of an increase in tran-
sactions after cut-off date. On the
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other hand, when we compare the
ratio: Volatility in the days that fo-
llow the cut-off date/volatility on the
days that precede the cut-off date in
the case of both kinds of dividends,
we see that in compulsory minimum
definite dividends the volatility ratio
for the days after cut-off date/days
prior to the cut off date is 3.28 higher
than in provisional dividends, which
have a ratio of 1.57, because in the
case of compulsory minimum defini-
te dividends there is an excess offer
on the day after the cut-off date, whi-
ch provokes a strong fall in share re-
turns.
Finally, Table 2 shows the average
per company in terms of provisional
dividends, and we see that it proves
our hypothesis «It is highly probable
that the fall of a company’s average
share returns on the day after the cut-
off date is higher than the average
increase of compulsory minimum di-
vidends on the cut-off date». We see
that in the six companies studied, the
fall of average share returns on the
day after the cut-off date is higher
than the average increase of provi-
sional dividends on the cut-off date.
SECTION V
Conclusions
The results of this study generate
different conclusions regarding the
effects that different dividends have
on share returns. There is no doubt
whatsoever that the high volatility
seen around the cut-off date is valid
evidence of the existence of the Clien-
tele Effect in Chile, which is reflec-
ted in the fact that investors change
their stance, according to their tax
preferences, and provoke a different
effect on share returns for provisio-
nal dividends or for compulsory mi-
nimum definite dividends.
Chile is a concentrated share market,
and in the past 10 years its most im-
portant feature is a high percentage
of shares in the hands of sharehol-
ders that pay high tax rates, and who
prefer shares that pay low dividends.
This is the case of provisional divi-
dends rather than compulsory mini-
mum definite dividends, and can be
explained by the fact that investors
will maintain portfolios created to
maximise return rates after tax. This
leads investors to pay high tax rates
per dividend, so they will prefer tho-
se shares with low dividend returns
and higher capital gain returns. As
an average, this implies that the
market places a different value on flo-
ws received as capital gains and as
dividends.
On the other hand, the market con-
siders that the distribution of provi-
sional dividends on the part of com-
panies to be positive, because the
company is capable of generating po-
sitive profits and will later be able to
produce the definite dividend esta-
blished by law, which amounts to 30%
of its liquid profits.
The following are the specific results
of this paper, which prove its hypo-
theses:
1. Average share returns fall -3.12%
on the day after the cut-off date.
This is higher than the 2.44% ave-
rage increase of compulsory mi-
nimum definite dividends at the
cut-off date.
2. In 89% of the cases analysed, the
fall of average corporate share
returns the day after cut-off date
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is higher than the average increa-
se of compulsory minimum defi-
nite dividends on the cut-off date.
3. The fall of average share returns
the day after the cut-off date is -
0.56% lower than the average
0.89% increase in the amounts of
provisional dividends at the cut-
off date.
4. 100% of the fall of a company’s
average share returns on the day
after the cut-off date is lower than
the average increase in provisio-
nal dividends on the cut-off date.
5. 25 days after the cut-off rate, com-
pulsory minimum definite divi-
dends have a volatility of 0.69%,
which is higher than the 0.21%
volatility rate during the 25 days
before the cut-off date.
6. 25 days after the cut-off rate, pro-
visional dividends have a volati-
lity of 0.22%, which is higher than
the 0.14% volatility rate during
the 25 days before the cut-off date.
7. The following is the ratio for com-
pulsory minimum definite divi-
dends: volatility after the cut-off
date/volatility prior to the cut-off
date is 3.28% higher than in provi-
sional dividends, which show
1.57%, This results from the fact
that compulsory minimum defini-
te dividends produce an excess offer
the day after the cut-off date, whi-
ch make share returns plummet.
Finally, it is important to note that
the existence of the clientele effect
on a determined market does not
mean that this should become simi-
larly apparent in other markets, be-
cause tax structures vary according
to countries, making results comple-
tely different from one country to
another.
For this reason, it would be interes-
ting to undertake a similar study in
another country so as to contrast re-
sults.
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Graph 1: Compulsory minimum definite dividends.
Source: Personal production
Source: Prepared by the authors (on the basis of Santiago Stock exchange data)
Graph 2: Provisional Dividends.
Source: Prepared by the authors (on the basis of Santiago Stock Exchange data)
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Table 2: Compulsory minimum definite dividends
Company Nº of dividend Average increase Averag Average L + 1 fass is higher
processes of dividend to be return than the average increase of
distributed in L decrease in L dividend to be distributed in L
Concha y Toro 30 0.49% -0.43% Yes
CMPC 24 0.89% -0.65% Yes
Copec 10 1.1% -0.8% Yes
CTI 24 1.94% -1.46% Yes
Gasco 45 0.55% -0.43% Yes
Gener 19 0.90% -0.48% Yes
Weighted Average 152 0.89% -0.66%
Table 1.  Averages according to company
Company Nº of dividend Average increase Average Average L + 1 fass is higher
processes of dividend to be return than the average increase of
distributes in L. decrease in L dividend to be distributed in L
Almendrosa 7 1.19% -0.81% Yes
Andina-B 7 1.11% -2.48% Yes
Andina-A 7 0.36% -1.45% Yes
Banemedica 10 3.18% -6.08% Yes
Besalco 7 1.08% -1.43% Yes
CAP 8 0.96% -1.35% Yes
CMPC 7 0.82% -1.44% Yes
Concha y Toro 8 0.60% 0.70 Yes
CTC(A) 8 0.56% -0.97% Yes
CTI 6 2-28% -1.06% NO
Endesa 8 1.76% -1.10% NO
Entel 8 1.33% -1.67% Yes
Esval (A) 8 1.15% -3.13% Yes
Gener 6 1.60% -1.68% Yes
Itata 8 3.50% -4.60% Yes
Pucobre (A) 10 4.0% -4.22% Yes
Soquimoc 10 8.03% -9.39% Yes
Terranova 7 1.11% -2,33% Yes
Zofri 14 5.52% -5.54% Yes
Weighted Average 152 2.44% -3.12%
Source: Prepared by the autors
Source: Prepared by the authors (with data from the Santiago Stock Exchange)
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